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HEALTH AS HUMAN NATURE AND CRITIQUE OF CULTURE
IN NIETZSCHE AND ZHUANG ZI
DANESH SINGH
ABSTRACT: Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi endorse a notion of health that relies on a theory of
human nature, in the sense that health is achieved when individuals live in accordance with
their nature. In order to lead healthy human lives, individuals must disabuse themselves of
pernicious cultural influences. Nietzsche believes that will to power and its constituent parts,
including desire and suffering, are an expression of human nature. Nietzsche opposes ascetic
morality on the grounds that it requires that humans deny basic human desires and strive to
eliminate human suffering. Zhuang Zi understands health as the perfection or wholeness of
de, which involves the acceptance of fate, a state in which individuals are at ease with the
inevitable, and lack strong evaluative attitudes and preferences and aversions, a product of
culture. I will argue that Zhuangist health includes elements of physical health, such as living
out one’s allotted span of years and avoiding harm by being useless. Zhuang Zi’s
endorsement of physical health seems incompatible with the fact that his Daoist exemplars
are sometimes disfigured and mutilated. While physical health is an important aspect in
Zhuangist health, psychological health is sufficient, as evidenced in two stories that employ
the notion of wholeness of de.
Keywords: Nietzsche; Zhuang Zi; health; human nature; culture

Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi (莊子) believe that what humans fundamentally are
provides a basis for how they ought to live. The normative health of human beings,
according to this view, is achieved when they live in accordance with that which they
essentially are. Both Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi characterize their normative visions in
terms of the category of health. Their respective notions of health are predicated on
appeals to what is natural for human beings, and these appeals to nature serve as
constraints for how humans ought to live. In addition, both thinkers are concerned
with disabusing individuals of harmful cultural influences that serve as an obstacle to
leading healthy human lives. Insofar as their respective normative visions set as their
target the goal of living naturally, free of pernicious cultural influences, we can
understand their respective projects as promoting a notion of normative health. In
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this study, I hope to bring together some of the existing literature in Nietzsche studies
and put it in dialogue with the philosophical literature on Zhuang Zi, in order to show
how the normative visions of both philosophers display this therapeutic quality.
Nietzsche understands will to power to be the ultimate expression of human life.
Drives express will to power in the sense that they strive towards dominance over the
self. Health is achieved when drives overcome resistance coming from competing
drives in the fulfillment of a particular desire. Nietzsche offers a critique of ascetic
morality on the grounds that it stands opposed to the structure of will to power. Will
to power, as a description of human nature, manifests in healthy and unhealthy ways,
in the sense that will to power can create accord or conflict in the psyche. Specifically,
ascetic morality is opposed to will to power in that it denies basic human desires and
strives to eliminate all human suffering, two essential components in the structure of
will to power. Nietzsche wishes to replace ascetic morality with a new set of value
standards that are continuous with will to power, standards that endorse self-regarding
desires as well as the art of experiment.
A therapeutic reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy illuminates a similar concern
with normative health in the thought of Zhuang Zi. He, like Nietzsche, makes appeals
to nature and the natural that are descriptive and normative in content. The full and
free development or perfection of de (zhi-de 至德), also referred to as the wholeness
of de (quan-de 全德), the natural ability inherent to all things in virtue of being the
kinds of things that they are, is essential to the attainment of the normative Way (dao
道) and to Zhuang Zi’s robust notion of normative health.
The perfection or wholeness of de describes the psychological and specifically
emotional aspect of health in Zhuang Zi’s thought. Following Fraser, I understand
this psychological aspect to refer to the acceptance of fate (ming 命). Individuals
confront situations and pressures about which they cannot do anything (bu-ke-nai-he
不可奈何); the goal is to be at ease (an 安) with the inevitable (bu-de-yi 不得已).
Importantly, this psychological aspect of health places specific importance on the
emotional lives of individuals. When individuals cultivate their de, intense emotions
that disturb this inner calm can no longer threaten their equanimity. For Zhuang Zi,
intense emotions that express joy, anger, sorrow, and delight are the result of
individuals taking on the wrong cognitive and evaluative attitudes about right and
wrong (shi-fei 是非) or the wrong preferences and aversions (hao-wu 好惡) towards
things. Zhuang Zi thinks that these attitudes and preferences and aversions are the
result of pernicious cultural influences that take individuals away from their nature.
Fraser's reading of Zhuang Zi’s philosophy does not include a set of concepts that
describe physical health. In this study, I explore the ways in which Zhuang Zi
discusses the physical aspects of health as part of his therapeutic project. In addition
to the psychological concept of perfection or wholeness of de, Zhuang Zi endorses
elements of physical health, including living out one’s allotted span of years (jin-nian
盡年, zhong-qi-tian-nian 終其天年) as well as keeping oneself physically whole and
free from various harms and deprivations by being useless (wu-yong 無用, wu-suo-ke
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yong 無所可用). I will discuss Zhuang Zi’s treatment of physical health in order to
clarify the role of physical health in Zhuang Zi’s broader notion of health.
At first blush, the notion that physical health is important to Zhuang Zi’s
therapeutic project seems counterintuitive, since this would commit him to the view
that individuals must keep their bodies intact in order to achieve robust normative
health. This view does not seem to square with the fact that many of Zhuang Zi’s
Daoist exemplars, such as Crippled Shu and Shu Shan No-Toes, are mutilated or
disfigured. I will argue that living out one’s allotted years and avoiding harm by
being useless is a mark of living naturally and hence an expression of health, even as
the psychological aspect of health is primary. Zhuang Zi explains in two stories from
the fifth chapter that “wholeness of de” (quan-de), which pertains solely to
psychological and emotional health, is more important than physical or bodily (xing
形) integrity. Zhuang Zi even suggests in these passages that wholeness of de is
sufficient to normative health.
1. HEALTH AS A THEORY OF NATURE AND CRITIQUE OF CULTURE
The philosophical category of health that I develop in this comparative study will
contend that descriptive metaphysics provides a basis for normative ethics. It is a
value laden account, in the sense that descriptive features of human nature are picked
out as relevant to a normative account of how human beings ought to live. Martha
Nussbaum rightly understands Aristotle’s ethical view in terms of the normative
concept of health that is associated with much ethical theory that emerged in ancient
Greek thought. For Aristotle, the full flourishing of humans’ moral nature should be
understood as engaging in activities that are expressive of their most essential
capabilities, without the impediments that serve as obstacles to it. (Nussbaum 1994,
30-31) Like other early Ancient Greek thinkers, Aristotle employs medical analogies
in order to draw out a similarity between the aim of doctors to heal diseased bodies
and the aim of philosophers to heal the soul of its maladies or impediments. (Aristotle
1999, 7) Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi, like Aristotle, pose arguments that depend on a
general description of nature. In the same way that Aristotle relies on explanations of
what is natural to establish his normative commitments, Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi will
also pick out important features of nature in order to develop their respective
normative concepts of health.
Separate from her reading of Aristotle, Nussbaum highlights the ways pernicious
cultural influences alienate humans from their nature. To articulate this aspect of the
Greek notion of health, Nussbaum departs from Aristotle and relies instead on the
Hellenistic philosophers, particularly the Stoics. (Nussbaum 1994) Nietzsche and
Zhuang Zi, like the Stoics, see culture as a significant threat to the realization of their
respective normative visions, and they believe, also like the Stoics, that in order to
achieve a state of health, individuals must first disabuse themselves of prejudices that
serve as an obstacle to normative health.1
1

For a comparison of Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi on the theme of cultural critique, see Hall (1984).

Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)

SINGH

94

2. NIETZSCHE AND HEALTH AS A THEORY OF NATURE
In order to make better sense of the structure of will to power, it is important to
understand it in the context of a drive theory that Nietzsche employs to describe the
self. For Nietzsche, the self is composed of sub-personal elements called drives. For
Nietzsche, drives are dispositions that express themselves by structuring the agent’s
perceptions, affects, and even reflective thought. (Katsafanas 2013) According to
Nietzsche’s drive theory, the self does not start out as a unified subject.2 Since there is
no substratum that ties the drives together, the subject is generally composed of drives
that are deeply contradictory. Accordingly, the drives are in constant competition
with one another, each vying for control and dominance over the others.3 On
Nietzsche’s view, the self is a platform for the struggle of the drives to play out.
(Leiter 2002, 103) In their desire to establish authority over the self, drives exert will
to power over other drives.
In the context of will to power, Nietzsche’s notion is a corrective to
Schopenhauer’s notion of will to life. (Nietzsche 2000a, 393, Reginster 2006, 103147) Nietzsche is no doubt at the same time indebted to Schopenhauer in his
formulation of will to power, in that Schopenhauer’s concept also conceives of
willing as a central feature of human existence. For both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer
alike, happiness is understood at least partly in terms of the satisfaction of desires
(Reginster 2006, 103-147). They argue that this basic striving in all wills seeks
satisfaction, and once a will can satisfy all these desires, then it can finally be happy.
Both also believe that the feeling of suffering results when desires are frustrated.
But Nietzsche’s account of will to power differs from Schopenhauer’s notion in
that for Nietzsche, power plays a salient role. Singular drives seek will to power in
the sense that they strive towards overcoming resistance in order to establish authority
over the self. In Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 259, Nietzsche explains that this
overcoming of resistance involves “appropriating,” “injuring,” “overpowering,” and
“exploiting” weaker drives. (Nietzsche 2000a, 393)4 In order for drives to have their
desires met, they must establish authority over the self by overpowering other drives.
Nietzsche’s account of will to power describes a dynamic movement that
distinguishes between the drive as it strives to overcome resistance and the drive’s
desire to have certain concrete aims met. When drives exert power over other drives,
this exertion of power does not in itself possess any particular content; its content is
determined by the desire that the drive’s willing directs itself towards. For Nietzsche,
to say that a drive wills to power implies that it wills something other than power
itself; it is also the pursuit of goals that are not yet satisfied. (Richardson 1996, 23-24,
2

See Nehamas (1985, 170-199). See also Clark and Dudrick (2012) as well as Parkes (1994).
To offer just a few examples of Nietzsche’s vivid depiction of the drives in competition with one
another, see Nietzsche (1997, 64-65) and Nietzsche (1997, 74-76) as well as Nietzsche (2000a, 203204).
4
See also Nietzsche (2000b, 514-515) for an account of will to power as described in terms of drives
overpowering other drives.
3
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Reginster 2006, 126-127) These interconnected aspects of will to power map on to
first-order and second-order desires respectively. (Reginster 2006, 132) 5 Will to
power is the second-order desire to overcome resistance as it pursues some concrete
first-order desire, which gives will to power its content. If the will to power is not
merely the second-order desire to desire, but also the first-order desire to overcome
resistance as it pursues some intentional object, then will to power will not be
satisfied unless three conditions are met: first, there must be some first order desire;
second, there must be resistance to the achievement of this first order desire; and third,
there must be success in overcoming the resistance. (Reginster 2006, 135-139) It is
important to note that while Nietzsche thinks that human desire is highly plastic, by
their nature, humans are disposed to pursue some first-order desires rather than others;
as we will see, Nietzsche believes that humans are naturally inclined to pursue
sensual and rapacious desires that are fundamentally self-regarding.
Of the scholars that have understood will to power to be a natural feature that
informs an ethical project, Janaway’s reading is particularly helpful for the purposes
of the present study. Janaway has given a reading of Nietzsche’s project that includes
will to power as a feature of human nature, expressive of human biology and manifest
in cultural practices. (Janaway 2007, 149) 6 Will to power, on Janaway’s reading,
manifests in healthy and unhealthy ways, in the sense that will to power can create
accord or conflict in the psyche. (Janaway 2007, 146) Janaway names the ascetic
priest, a proponent of ascetic ideals, as an example of an individual whose psyche is
conflicted. Nietzsche calls ascetic morality a contradiction in Sections 11 (Nietzsche
2000b, 553) and 13 of the third essay. As he explains in Section 13: “It will be
immediately obvious that such a self-contradiction as the ascetic appears to represent,
‘life against life,’ is, physiologically considered and not merely psychologically, a
simple absurdity.” (Nietzsche 2000b, 556) When Nietzsche calls ascetic morality a
contradiction, Janaway explains that this means that the priest “genuinely grows in
power (over himself) as he dissociates from and destroys his natural strength.”
(Janaway 2007, 146) I argue that the denial of desire and suffering, as important
components of will to power, serve as a basis for Nietzsche’s critique of ascetic
morality, since ascetic morality requires that humans deny their natural propensities
to have basic desires and to accept suffering in the sense of confronting resistance to
desires.
Ascetic morality, as a pernicious cultural development, requires the denial of
basic human desires, which is a key characteristic of ascetic ideals. As Leiter has
pointed out, ascetic ideals are composed of norms that place value on states of selfdenial in which individuals relinquish the satisfaction of basic human desires. These
include sensual and rapacious desires of the kind that are fundamentally self5

Reginster borrows the language of first-order and second-order desires from Clark (1990, 211), who
sees will to power as just the second-order desire. I follow Reginster in understanding will to power as
having a two-fold structure that contains both first-order and second-order desires. Reginster’s and
Clark’s readings employ terminology taken from Harry Frankfurt’s philosophy. See Frankfurt (1971).
6
In addition to Janaway, see Richardson (1996) and Schacht (1983) for readings that understand
Nietzsche’s notion of will to power as informing an ethical project.
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regarding. (Leiter 2002, 246) Nietzsche devotes the third essay of his On the
Genealogy of Morals to explaining how the ascetic lifestyle, with its emphasis on
self-denial, opposes human desires. (Nietzsche 2000b, 533-599) Ascetic ideals locate
ultimate value in self-denial, that is, in a source that can only be found independent of
what is most natural to humans. Also in the third essay, Nietzsche writes that ascetic
ideals praise poverty, chastity and humility (Nietzsche 2000b, 544) as its cardinal
virtues and valorizes self-denial at the expense of the satisfaction of these basic
human desires in particular. Ascetic ideals are in conflict with will to power because
these ideals oppose the propensity to have desires, such as those for wealth, prestige,
and sexual gratification. (Leiter 2002, 246) Nietzsche believes that the very desires
that are opposed by the ascetic ideal are particularly problematic, since these are the
desires that are most instinctive to humans. It is in this sense that ascetic ideals deny
desire and thereby deny will to power as a fact of human nature.
In the same way that the denial of desire is detrimental to living in accordance with
will to power, so too is the denial of suffering. Reginster’s reading of the role of
suffering in Nietzsche’s thought has already shown how suffering, defined in terms of
resistance, is necessary to will to power. According to Reginster, Nietzsche disagrees
with Schopenhauer’s view concerning the role of suffering in a happy human life.
(Reginster 2006, 103-147) For Schopenhauer, what underlies all striving is a desire to
desire (Reginster 2006, 122). We always desire, and this desire causes pain because it
leads people to experience life as lacking in some way (Reginster 2006, 109).
Unsatisfied desires are by their very nature painful and thereby cause suffering, and
so if happiness is possible at all, then it must consist in a cessation of all desires.
(Reginster 2006, 108) Happiness, according to Schopenhauer, must be some final
satisfaction of the will, in which no new desires and wants are generated.
Schopenhauer would agree with the ascetic priest that the ultimate goal is to eliminate
desires.
In the third essay of his Genealogy, Nietzsche attacks Schopenhauer’s ascetic
view that the goal of life is to extinguish all willing, in order to achieve a state of
happiness in which nothing is wanting. Here, Nietzsche responds to Schopenhauer’s
aesthetic theory more specifically, a theory that appropriates Kant’s well-known
definition of the beautiful: “That is beautiful…which gives us pleasure without
interest.” (Nietzsche 2000b, 540) According to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s insistence
that the best kind of aesthetic appreciation is constituted by disinterested
contemplation is in fact disingenuous. Nietzsche cites Schopenhauer’s remark that
aesthetic contemplation “counteracts sexual ‘interestedness’” (Nietzsche 2000b, 540)
as evidence that Schopenhauer’s theory conceals his personal desire to extinguish the
painful sexual desires that constantly tormented him. Nietzsche sees in Schopenhauer
the man, and in his thought, a longing to escape the suffering that accompanies these
desires. Nietzsche understands Schopenhauer’s attempt to extinguish all willing
through a state of disinterested contemplation as an attempt to escape all suffering.
(Nietzsche 2000b, 541-542) For Nietzsche, this is problematic, since suffering is an
important component of will to power. In order to eventually overcome resistance
from other drives that compose the self, a given drive must first confront resistance,
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that is, confront suffering itself. As Reginster puts the point: “The will to power,
insofar as it is a will to the overcoming of resistance, must necessarily also will the
resistance to be overcome.” (Reginster 2006, 133) For Nietzsche, without suffering,
drives cannot establish authority over the self, a prerequisite to human health.
If the reading of Nietzsche given in the present study is correct, then Nietzsche’s
notion of will to power leads to a puzzle. The satisfaction of desires ultimately leads
to its own dissatisfaction, since the achievement of the end means an end to the
activity as well. Once individuals have achieved their desires, they will be frustrated,
for they are deprived of the pursuit that gave will to power a goal. The puzzle is
resolved in light of the fact that, for Nietzsche, built into the structure of will to power
is a desire for new desires to be generated and for new resistances to be overcome.
Nietzsche’s discussion of human health and sickness parallels his treatment of
will to power and the puzzle that accompanies it. Nietzsche associates health with the
successful overcoming of resistance and fulfillment of a given desire, and sickness
with the suffering or resistance itself. Just as the drives that exert will to power
require suffering, human health requires sickness.7 If health is constituted by an
overcoming of resistance, then what is first required is a state of deficiency that
makes possible resistance and an eventual overcoming. This is why Nietzsche doubts
that we can completely do away with sickness in his notion of health. As he explains
in an aphorism from The Gay Science,
Finally, the great question would still remain whether we can really dispense with
illness—even for the sake of our virtue—and whether our thirst for knowledge and selfknowledge in particular does not require the sick soul as much as the healthy, and
whether, in brief, the will to health alone, is not a prejudice, cowardice, and perhaps a bit
of very subtle barbarism and backwardness. (Nietzsche 1974, 177).8

For Nietzsche, health should be understood as a state continually renewed as
individuals pursue greater stages of health. Without sickness, there is no resistance to
be overcome. If health welcomes resistance in the pursuit of increased capabilities
and self-enhancement, then it must also affirm the suffering that accompanies it, since
without suffering, individuals cannot face new challenges in order to reach greater
states of health.
While Nietzsche allows for myriad possibilities9 concerning which set of values
facilitate a state of health, what they all have in common is that they require
individuals to posit values continuous with the structure of will to power. Will to
power, as a fact of human nature, serves as a constraint to defining how humans
ought to live. In Aphorism 44 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche likens human
beings to plants in order to explain what basic values are necessary in order to lead
7

For a discussion of will to power and Nietzschean health, see Letteri (1990), Long (1990), and
Lawton (1987/1988).
8
See also Nietzsche (1974, 37), where Nietzsche discusses his movement from physical and
psychological sickness to a restored health.
9
See Nietzsche’s position that there are “innumerable healths.” Nietzsche (1974, 177).
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healthy lives. People, like plants, must be properly cultivated in order to grow and
flourish. While some value orientations stunt the growth of humans, others promote
their growth,10 and what makes his healthy individuals different from those compelled
by existing morality is that “[w]e opposite men, having opened our eyes and
conscience to the question where and how the plant ‘man’ has so far grown most
vigorously to a height—we think this has happened every time under the opposite
conditions…” (Nietzsche 2000a, 244)
Nietzsche goes on in Aphorism 44 to say that modern people have generally
failed to see the ways in which an individual’s “power of invention and simulation
(his ‘spirit’) had to develop under prolonged pressure and constraint into refinement
and audacity,” and about how “his life-will had to be enhanced into an unconditional
power-will.” He elaborates:
We think that hardness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and the heart, life in
hiding, stoicism, the art of experiment, and devilry of every kind, that everything evil,
terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents,
serves the enhancement of the species “man” as much as its opposite does.11(Nietzsche
2000a, 244-245)

Given the account of desire and suffering and their role in the structure of will to
power discussed above, it is unsurprising that Nietzsche believes that a social world
which develops “everything in [man] that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents” will
promote human health. Modern people find these aspects of humanity awful, since
for one they are based on our basic self-regarding desires, such as desires for wealth,
prestige, and sexual gratification. But according to Nietzsche, these values are
compelling precisely for the reason that they reflect a natural part of humanity.
It is also unsurprising that Nietzsche believes that we should promote values that
facilitate “hardness,” “danger,” and “the art of experiment”—in direct contrast to the
existing values of security, lack of danger, and comfort. 12 The art of experiment
refers not just to conducting experiments in order to discover new values to replace
ascetic morality; it also refers to a constant and continual desire to overcome
obstacles and challenges in order to achieve higher states of human health. According
to Nietzsche’s notion of health, there is no end-state of individual perfection
(Swanton 2006, Reginster 2006, 235-242). This means that individuals must
constantly oppose their most cherished values. Nietzsche discusses the necessity of
opposing those values and ways of life that individuals have once embraced and come
to love. He writes,
Whoever has a soul that craves to have experienced the whole range of values and
10

See Geuss (1997, 9), where he discusses Nietzsche’s plant analogy in connection to a theory of
human development.
11
See also Nietzsche (2000a, 323) and Nietzsche’s call to “live dangerously”: Nietzsche (1974, 228229).
12
For an account of the character traits that Nietzsche believes best promote health, see Welshon,
(2006).
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desiderata to date, and to have sailed around all the coasts of this ideal “mediterranean”;
whoever wants to know from the adventures of his own most authentic experience how a
discoverer and conqueror of the ideal feels, and also an artist, a saint, a legislator, a sage,
a scholar, a pious man, a soothsayer, and one who stands divinely apart in the old style—
needs one thing above everything else: the great health—that one does not merely have
but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again,
and must give it up. (Nietzsche 1974, 346)13

Nietzsche’s notion of health, with its emphasis on constant and continual growth,
implies the necessity of cultivating brief, as opposed to enduring, habits. Indeed,
Nietzsche says that only brief habits can bring enduring satisfaction. (Nietzsche 1974,
236-237) While the good habit in question nourishes individuals for a time, one day it
will no longer serve them, and they must part ways with it. And although Nietzsche
recognizes a propensity in humans to naïvely insist that their current habits will
endure permanently, in truth, for Nietzsche’s healthy individuals, another habit will
come along and replace it (Nietzsche 1974, 237). In light of this concept of health in
which those who engage in the art of experiment apply their knowledge and have
brief, as opposed to enduring, habits, individuals should be willing to abandon once
deep-rooted values, in favor of others that facilitate greater stages of health of the
human being.
It should not surprise us that Nietzsche endorses a notion of health that resembles
Aristotle’s ethics and Greek thought more generally, given Nietzsche’s debt to Greek
philosophy. I will argue that putting Nietzsche’s therapeutic vision in dialogue with
Zhuang Zi’s thought can help us to see how his Daoist vision also concerns itself with
the health of humans. Specifically, Zhuang Zi’s vision requires that individuals
follow the full and free development, or the perfection (zhi) or wholeness (quan), of
their natural abilities (de), so that they may carry out healthy psychological lives.
Zhuang Zi, then, is also concerned with the full functioning of human beings, free of
any unnatural influences, and his normative project can also be understood as
endorsing a notion of health in a similar way to that of Nietzsche.
3. ZHUANG ZI AND HEALTH AS A THEORY OF NATURE
Unlike in Nietzsche’s corpus, the words “health” and “therapy” do not appear in the
Zhuang-Zi. There is no one term in the original that by itself conveys the notion of
health that I am ultimately attributing to Zhuang Zi. As we will see below, a variety
of concepts in the Zhuan-Zi pertain to nature and the natural. Through the use of
different, but overlapping, concepts, Zhuang Zi articulates a notion of normative
health in which a description of nature informs a normative project. Ivanhoe has
already noted that in Daoist thought generally, one finds a bundle of concepts relating
to health and well-being, such as “living out one’s allotted span of years, keeping
oneself physically whole and free from a variety of harms and deprivations, and
enjoying psychological ease, comfort, and contentment.” (Ivanhoe 2002, XXII)
13

See also Nietzsche (1968, 227).
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Zhuang Zi’s thought conforms to this general Daoist worldview. He endorses a way
of life in which individuals live out their years (jin-nian, zhong-qi-tian-nian), avoid
harm by being useless (wu-yong, wu-suo-ke-yong), and experience psychological and
specifically emotional well-being by accepting fate (ming) and appropriately
negotiating the inevitable (bu-ke-nai-he, bu-de-yi).
Zhuang Zi reserves his notion of de to refer specifically to psychological health.
Feng You Lan rightly understands de to play an integral role in Zhuang Zi’s view of
how nature and normativity relate. Following Feng, I define de in terms of a natural
ability inherent to all things in virtue of being the kinds of things that they are. As
Feng explains,
…[O]ur [de] is what makes us what we are. We are happy when this [de] or natural
ability of ours is fully and freely exercised, that is, when our nature is fully and freely
developed. (Fung 1976, 105)

In a famous passage from the second chapter, Zhuang Zi points out that different
species possess a different set of preferences based on the kinds of things they are.
(Watson 1968, 45-46, Zhuangzi 2/64-73) Given the makeup of humans, it is
impossible for them to rest while they are submerged in water, but for the loach, a
kind of fish, it is absolutely necessary. Similarly, while monkeys live in trees, humans
simply cannot. Living things, like deer, loaches, and trees, are different in their
respective natures, and consequently, their respective abilities, or de, are also
different. What all organisms share, however, is that they are all equally happy when
they fully and freely exercise their de.
The cultivation of de entails that sages avoid the kind of inner harm that disrupts
the psychological, and especially the emotional, well-being that accompanies
harmony with the normative Way (dao). Feng relates his brief discussion of de in the
Zhuang-Zi to a distinction between what is of heaven (tian)14 and what is of man (ren
人). In order to explain what it means to cultivate de, Ruo of the North Sea
distinguishes between what is heavenly or natural and what is human, by
characterizing heaven as what is on the inside, and the human as what is on the
outside (tian-zai-nei, ren-zai-wai 天在內, 人在外). (Watson 1968, 183, Zhuangzi
17/50) Ruo discusses what is human in terms of artifice: “Putting a halter on the
horse’s head, piercing the ox’s nose—this is what I mean by the human (ren).”
(Watson 1968, 183, Zhuangzi 17/52) Human artifice has managed to do harm to
nature. When the artificial overcomes what is natural, it is impossible for nature to
take its course and for things to harmonize with the normative Way (dao).
Fraser’s reading of Zhuang Zi offers an excellent analysis of the role of the
perfection of de (zhi-de) in Zhuang Zi’s therapeutic project. (Fraser 2011, 98-100)
Specifically, he believes that for Zhuang Zi, the perfection of de is a psychological
14

For examples of the use of tian in the Zhuang-Zi, see Watson (1968, 56), Zhuangzi 4/18; Watson
(1968, 75), Zhuangzi 5/53-55; Watson (1968, 87), Zhuangzi 6/74; Watson (1968, 78), Zhuangzi 6/7;
Watson (1968, 40), Zhuangzi 2/29; Watson (1968, 41), Zhuangzi 2/39-40.
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concept that describes an acceptance of fate (ming) in which individuals are at ease
(an) with the inevitable (bu-ke-nai-he, bu-de-yi). As part of his reading of Zhuang
Zi’s view of psychological health, Fraser pays special attention to the role of the
emotions. The acceptance of fate and the inevitable should facilitate a state of
affective equanimity, in which intense emotions are ruled out. (Fraser 2011)
Fraser cites several examples of Daoist exemplars who embody perfection of de.
Among these examples is Wang Tai, an ex-convict and amputee who has achieved a
“constant heart” (chang-xin 常心) based on a combination of cognitive and affective
attitudes characteristic of the Daoist way of life. (Fraser 2011, 100, Watson 1968, 6869, Zhuangzi 5/1-13) He has an embodied understanding of the idea that myriad
things are “one” in the sense that they form a spatial-temporal whole; as a result he
has no experience of loss when things transform as they do. Fraser explains that
Wang Tai has no preferences and is emotionally unperturbed by even the greatest of
changes, such as death, for he accepts all these changes as fixed by fate and thus
beyond his control. He does not even feel intense emotions over the amputation of his
foot; he sees it rather as he would the loss of a clump of dirt.
Fraser discusses one story in detail from the fourth chapter, “In the World of
Men,” which he believes captures the spirit of psychological health characteristic of
Zhuang Zi’s therapeutic project. (Fraser 2011, 98-100, Watson 1968, 59-61, Zhuangzi
4/34-53) Zi Gao, Duke of She, a high official of the state of Chu, is having a
conversation with Confucius. The duke has been recently assigned by the King of
Chu to handle some important diplomatic affairs in the state of Qi. He doubts his
ability to successfully carry out this mission and is fearful to the point of being
feverish. In his conversation with Confucius, Zi Gao notes that Confucius had already
once told him that only a person who follows the Way (dao) can handle affairs
without causing one of two kinds of harms. The first concerns trouble with the
balance of yin and yang, which leads to bodily health problems of the kind that the
duke experienced in the story. The second kind of harm has to do with troubles in the
human dao (ren dao 人道), which concerns problems in human relations and affairs.
Zi Gao finds himself in a situation in which he cannot refuse the King’s orders, and
neither can he fall short of bringing about a successful outcome in his mission, for if
he fails, he will surely be punished. This predicament has brought about a
considerable amount of emotional strain for the duke.
While the story involves a duke on a political mission, according to Fraser, it is
meant to speak not just to affairs of the state, but rather to human life more generally.
The story is meant to set the stage for Confucius to discuss Daoist self-cultivation.
Confucius responds to Zi Gao’s predicament by saying that humans invariably find
themselves in situations governed by fate. Confucius offers familial and political
relationships as examples of such situations:
Confucius said, “In the world, there are two great decrees: one is fate (ming) and the
other is duty (yi 義). That a son should love his parents is fate—you cannot erase this
from his heart. That a subject should serve his ruler is duty—there is no place he can go
and be without his ruler, no place he can escape to between heaven and earth. These are
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called the great decrees. Therefore, to serve your parents and be content to follow them
anywhere—this is the perfection of filial piety. To serve your ruler and be content to do
anything for him—this is the peak of loyalty. (Watson 1968, 59-60, Zhuangzi 4/39-42)

Humans are born into families and are invested in the care of their aging parents. It is
part of the fate of individuals to be confronted with these circumstances. In the same
way, individuals are also born into political society. It is their duty to follow the
requirements that are imposed on them as political creatures. As such, they are
subject to circumstances beyond their control. In order to follow the Way, the aim is
to manage these and various other inevitable matters. In effectively negotiating these
situations, individuals maintain the health of their minds (xin 心). The maintenance of
psychological and emotional health is an important aspect of the perfection de, as
Zhuang Zi’s Confucius goes on to explain in the same passage:
And to serve your own mind (xin) so that sadness or joy do not sway or move it; to
understand what you can do nothing about (bu-ke-nai-he 不可奈何) and to be content
with it as with fate (an-zhi-ruo-ming 安之若命)—this is the perfection of virtue (de-zhizhi 德之至). As a subject and a son, you are bound to find things you cannot avoid. If
you act in accordance with the state of affairs and forget about yourself, then what leisure
will you have to love life and hate death? Act in this way and you will be all right.
(Watson 1968, 60, Zhuangzi 4/42-44)

On Fraser’s reading, the most integral part of reaching the perfection de is for
individuals to accept their fate (ming). Individuals confront situations and pressures
about which they cannot do anything (bu-ke-nai-he); the goal is to be at ease (an)
with the inevitable (bu-de-yi). (Fraser 2011, 99) When individuals have successfully
perfected their de, intense emotions that disturb this inner calm can no longer threaten
their equanimity. Individuals who have sufficiently perfected their de live more
naturally in the sense that they are able to attend fully to their surroundings; they
achieve an optimal level of efficiency and harmony in relation to their environment.
Fraser’s therapeutic reading, as a psychophysical account of health, takes note of
physical health as a necessary part of Zhuang Zi’s vision as well as inextricably
linked to the psychological and more specifically, to the emotional aspects of health.
He mentions how, in early Chinese thought, emotions were understood as states of qi
that constitute qing (情), a term that can be translated as affections, constitution, or
status. (Fraser 2011, 103-104) For Zhuang Zi, intense emotions that express joy,
anger, sorrow, and delight are the result of individuals taking on the wrong cognitive
and evaluative attitudes about right and wrong (shi-fei) or the wrong preferences and
aversions (hao-wu) towards things. (Fraser 2011, 103-104) Zhuang Zi thinks that
these attitudes are often the result of pernicious cultural influences—a mark of the
artificial, i.e., of man (ren) rather than of nature (tian)—that take individuals away
from their authentic selves. Zhuang Zi employs the metaphor of “bonds” and “ties” in
order to describe a deficient state of being entangled in the world’s affairs. The
metaphor is meant to describe how certain unnatural orientations in the world,
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manifested in having certain socially induced cognitive and evaluative attitudes, bind
individuals to things, which prevent them from flowing freely in their environment, as
Daoist sages are able to do. The psychophysical explanation of these kinds of bonds,
according to Fraser, is that the attitudes that accompany them will cause qi (energies
氣) to become fixated on some approved or disapproved, preferred or disliked, thing.
This fixation creates unhealthy emotional states that are the result of culturally
inculcated approvals and disapprovals or preferences and aversions. Alternatively, the
qi of Daoist sages flows freely through the heart and body, which corresponds to a
capacity to adapt fluidly and flexibly in any situation.
Although Fraser provides a psychophysical explanation as part of his therapeutic
reading, his account is incomplete without mention of various concepts that pertain
specifically to physical health. Berkson has recently noted how physical health, as
part of a view of nature, plays a significant role in Zhuang Zi’s positive project.
(Berkson 2011)15 Berkson’s focus is not to lay out a therapeutic project so much as
describe Zhuang Zi’s normative view of how individuals should relate to their death,
a substantial part of which concerns the preservation of physical health by way of
individuals living out their allotted span of years (jin-nian, zhong-qi-tian-nian) and
avoiding harm by being useless (wu-yong, wu-suo-ke-yong). Berkson’s account,
however, relates to Zhuang Zi’s therapeutic project, insofar as physical integrity plays
an important role in his broader notion of health.
While the perfection of de refers to psychological and emotional health, Zhuang
Zi believes that it also facilitates the avoidance of physical harm, which he thinks is
important to health more generally. When two officials from the state of Chu are sent
by the King to request Zhuang Zi’s service, they find Zhuang Zi fishing in the Pu
River. Zhuang Zi has no interest in accepting the position, for to do so would mean to
put himself in harm’s way. Zhuang Zi responds to their request by saying,
“I have heard that there is a sacred tortoise in Chu that has been dead for three thousand
years. The king keeps it wrapped in cloth and boxed, and stores it in the ancestral temple.
Now would this tortoise rather be dead and have its bones left behind and honored? Or
would it rather be alive and dragging its tail in the mud?”
“It would rather be alive and dragging its tail in the mud,” said the two officials.
Zhuang Zi said, “Go away! I’ll drag my tail in the mud!”(Watson 1968, 188, Zhuangzi
17/81-84)16

Humans, and perhaps all beings, possess by their nature a propensity to value life. But
given their limitless desires as well as their unique capacity to think, act intentionally,
and in turn stray from their nature, humans are also able to abandon their proper place
in the cosmological order (Berkson 2011, 218), thereby putting their physical health
at great risk. In this story, the kind of harm that Zhuang Zi has in mind is likely
15

See also Coutinho and Sigurdsson (2005). In their study, they also offer a reading of Nietzsche,
Zhuang Zi, and health. Their reading of Zhuang Zi’s thought employs the notions of yang-sheng (to
nurture life) and zhong-qi-tian-nian (to last out one’s natural years).
16
I have changed all place and personal names in this passage to standard pinyin romanization.
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primarily psychological harm that results from the pursuit of unnatural desires, such
as for wealth and power. These unnatural desires, which are, according to Zhuang Zi,
cultural inculcations that reflect unnatural attitudes as well as preferences and
aversions toward things, can bring about physical harm as well as psychological harm.
It is for this reason that Zhuang Zi advises us against their pursuit and instead
endorses a way of life in which individuals lead simple and carefree lives.
In other passages, Zhuang Zi is more explicit about how the perfection of de
facilitates invulnerability to physical harm. Daoist sages, whose de are perfected, are
protected against extreme physical threats. (Berkson 2011, 205) In a passage from the
first chapter, Zhuang Zi describes one such sage as totally invincible to harm: “There
is nothing that can harm this man. Though flood waters pile up to the sky, he will not
drown. Though a great drought melts metal and stone and scorches the earth and hills,
he will not be burned.” (Watson 1968, 33, Zhuangzi 1/32-33) And in the seventeenth
chapter, Ruo of the North Sea tells the Lord of the River about how cultivating de in
oneself increases the sage’s invulnerability to physical harm. Zhuangzi writes, “When
a man has perfect virtue (zhi-de), fire cannot burn him, water cannot drown him, cold
and heat cannot afflict him, birds and beasts cannot injure him.” (Watson 1968, 182,
Zhuangzi 17/48-49) These depictions of the sage employ fantastical imagery and
hyperbole to illustrate the advantages of living in accordance with the Daoist Way.
The basic philosophical point is that in cultivating de, individuals are more likely able
to avoid the kinds of physical harm that the pursuit of unnatural desires, such as the
pursuit of power and wealth, a mark of corrupt culture, may bring about. Zhuang Zi
explains at the end of the passage that the sage who has perfected his de
“distinguishes between safety and danger, contents himself with fortune or misfortune,
and is cautious in his comings and goings. Therefore nothing can harm him.” (Watson
1968, 182, Zhuangzi 17/49-50)
Zhuang Zi endorses being useless (wu-yong, wu-suo-ke-yong) in order to avoid
physical harm, and he employs imagery of useless trees to convey how the avoidance
of harm can facilitate the goal of living out one’s years. (Berkson 2011, 206) In one
such story (Watson 1968, 63-65, Zhuangzi 4/64-75), a carpenter tells his apprentice to
pass over a certain tree that has grown so large that people are constantly
congregating around it in order to admire it. The tree is worthless, says the carpenter,
because it cannot be used to make things like boats and coffins. That night, the oak
tree appears to him in a dream. The tree criticizes the carpenter for his fixation on the
value of being useful. It is precisely because the tree is so useless that it has been able
to live so long. Other trees, such as pear trees and orange trees, die prematurely, since
they are so useful. According to the tree, “Their utility makes their life miserable for
them, and so they don’t get to finish out the years Heaven gave them (zhong-qi-tiannian), but are cut off in mid-journey.” (Watson 1968, 64, Zhuangzi 4/70-71) The tree
in the dream explains that it has been trying to be of no use for a long time. (wu-suoke-yong)17
17

See also Watson (1968, 65), Zhuangzi 4/75-79 for a story involving Zi Qi of Nan Bo and the useless
(bu-cai 不材) tree.
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In the context of the human world, individuals who are useless like certain trees
are able to avoid premature death, and in so doing, can live a long life. In one story
involving a hunchback (Watson 1968, 66, Zhuangzi 4/83-86), Zhuang Zi offers an
illustration of a Daoist exemplar that is able to preserve his physical health. Crippled
Shu is severely disfigured. But it is precisely his uselessness (wu-yong) in battle that
offers him the possibility of physical health in one important respect: it prevents him
from having to fight in battle and meet an early death. He is able to take care of his
basic needs, and although he leads a modest life, he lives in such a way as to ensure
that he “finish out the years Heaven gave him” (zhong-qi-tian-nian). (Watson 1968,
66, Zhuangzi 4/86)
At first blush, the account of physical health given here seems to be in conflict
with the rest of Zhuang Zi’s thought. It may seem counterintuitive to think that the
preservation of physical health has an important role to play in Zhuang Zi’s vision. If
bodily integrity plays such an important role, then why is it that so many of his Daoist
exemplars are mutilated or disfigured? What if, as in the case of Shu Shan No-Toes
explained below, it is an individual’s fate to become disfigured in the course of his or
her life? Or what if an individual is born without a limb or with serious disfigurement,
as presumably was the case for Crippled Shu? If physical integrity is necessary for
overall health, this would preclude the possibility of Shu Shan No-Toes and Crippled
Shu attaining the normative Way (dao). If physical health is so important, one might
wonder why exactly Zhuang Zi would praise those who, for whatever reason, fail to
keep their bodies intact.18
It is clear that Zhuang Zi encourages individuals to keep their physical bodies
intact and out of harm’s way, for in doing so, individuals live in accordance with
what is natural. But at the same time, Zhuang Zi also believes that physical health is
not necessary for the achievement of his Daoist vision. I argue that even as physical
health plays an important role in Zhuang Zi’s therapeutic project, psychological,
including emotional, health is sufficient for the achievement of Zhuang Zi’s
therapeutic vision. In two stories from the fifth chapter, Zhuang Zi suggests that
psychological health is sufficient for the attainment of the normative Way. These two
passages, in contrasting the wholeness of de (quan-de) with keeping the physical
body (xing) whole and intact, make clear that bodily wholeness is not necessary for
health, while wholeness of de is sufficient for normative health.
In the first of the two relevant stories from the fifth chapter, the mutilated Shu
Shan No-Toes hobbles over to Confucius’ school to request admittance, but he is
denied entrance. No-Toes cannot understand why Confucius refuses to teach him
simply because he was unable to preserve his body whole. No-Toes claims that he
possesses “something that is worth more than a foot” (you you zun-zu-zhe cun, 猶有
18

In the context of Zhuang Zi’s view of death, Berkson recognizes a similar tension. On the one hand,
Zhuang Zi accepts death; on the other hand, he endorses a view that individuals should strive to avoid
it. (Berkson 2011, 192) Berkson’s answer to this problem is that Zhuang Zi endorses the cultivation of
life (yang-sheng 養生) generally, rather than longevity in the restricted sense of living as long as
possible. (Berkson 2011, 205, 207) It seems, then, that some aspects of yang-sheng pertain to
psychological health, rather than just physical health.
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尊足者存). (Watson 1968, 71, Zhuangzi 5/26) Confucius realizes his mistake; he
decides to invite No-Toes into his school to receive the Master’s teachings. But it is
too late, and No-Toes has already left. Confucius tells his disciples who have
witnessed this event:
Confucius said, “Be diligent, my disciples! Here is No-Toes, a man who has had his foot
cut off, and still he’s striving to learn so he can make up for the evil of his former conduct.
How much more, then, should men whose virtue is still unimpaired (er kuang quan-de zhi
ren hu 而況全德之人乎)! (Watson 1968, 71, Zhuangzi 5/28-29)

The moralist Confucius can only concern himself with outer wholeness, which is
manifest in the preservation of the body, a wholeness that Confucius mistakenly
conflates with an inner ability to perfect one’s de. Zhuang Zi uses Confucius as a foil
to illustrate the point that bodily integrity and psychological and emotional wholeness
are two distinct things and that psychological health is more important than bodily
integrity.
At the end of the story, No-Toes has a conversation with Lao Zi about why
Confucius has no chance of truly understanding the Daoist vision. (Watson 1968, 72,
Zhuangzi 5/29-31) In this last part of the passage, No-Toes elaborates on what it
means to value “something that is worth more than a foot.” It refers to an inner, rather
than an outer, wholeness that pertains to a psychological and emotional reorientation.
It entails a transformation of the sort in which individuals rid themselves of the
pursuit of fame and reputation and have the right understanding of death, as No-Toes
and his friend, the legendary Lao Zi, explain at the end of the story.
In the story that follows the one about No-Toes, Confucius appears again in an
exchange with Duke Ai of Lu. The Duke has a conversation with Confucius about a
man named Ai Tai Tuo (Watson 1968, 72-74, Zhuangzi 5/31-49), a physically
unattractive but highly charismatic man. He has the ability to win trust and affection
without saying or doing anything in particular. Ai Tai Tuo’s “capacity” (cai 才),
pertains to a psychological and emotional facility that “employs the body” (shi-qixing-zhe 使其形者). (Fraser 2011, 101) Confucius tells a story about some piglets
who were at the body of their dead mother, in order to explain the significance of Ai
Tai Tuo’s capacity. Confucius points out that once the piglets realized that their
mother was no longer alive, they left her. He explains that what the piglets loved
about their mother was not her body, but what moved it. In the same way, what
makes Ai Tai Tuo so special is not his body, but his capacity (cai), or wholeness of de,
that employs the body. Confucius has this to say about Ai Tai Tuo and his wholeness
of de (quan-de): “If so much care is taken to keep the body whole (xing-quan 形全),
how much more in the case of a man whose virtue is whole (er kuang quan-de zhi-ren
hu)?” (Watson 1968, 73, Zhuangzi 5/41-42) In the passages about No-Toes and Ai
Tai Tuo, we have seen how the cultivation of de, which concerns psychological
health, is contrasted with bodily health. While it is true that Zhuangist health relates
to physical as well as psychological health, the latter is given distinct priority over the
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former, to such a degree that psychological health is even understood as being
sufficient for the attainment of the normative Way.
In the present study, I have argued that both Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi endorse a
notion of health. The concept of health relies on a theory of nature, which informs a
normative project. It asserts the view that descriptive metaphysics provides a basis for
normative ethics. It is a value laden account, in that particular descriptive features of
human nature are picked out as relevant to a normative account of how human beings
ought to live. Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi conceive their respective visions in
therapeutic terms, in the sense that each vision depends on the health of human beings.
While each normative view contains its own respective conception of the healthy
human being, the goal for both philosophers is to align individuals with their
authentic natures. Both conceptions of health also assert that culture is an obstacle to
the achievement of living naturally. For Nietzsche, ascetic morality as a cultural
development stands in the way of living in accordance with will to power; for Zhuang
Zi, having unnatural attitudes and preferences and aversions, also a product of culture,
are the greatest obstacle to living in accordance with the normative Way.
But while the normative projects of Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi share in certain
structural features, the specific content that make up each of their respective visions is
radically dissimilar. For a start, both Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi differ in terms of what
they take to be pernicious cultural influences, as the previous paragraph makes clear.
In addition, Nietzschean health requires that individuals replace existing morality
with new standards of value continuous with will to power, while Zhuangist health
requires that individuals cultivate the perfection (zhi) or wholeness (quan) of de,
which involves disabusing individuals of any and all values.
In an article that lays out a novel reading of Aristotle’s ethics, McDowell
discusses in what sense he believes the great philosopher employs a metaphysical
theory of nature to inform a normative view. Given that humans lack a preexisting
normative order, descriptive metaphysics will never be able to fully bridge the gap
between itself and normative ethics. McDowell’s Aristotle believes that humans must
posit values that are in some important sense continuous with human nature—they are
naturally made, not naturally given. In the context of the thought of Aristotle,
McDowell distinguishes between two distinct senses of nature that require teasing
apart. There is a “mere” or first nature that serves as a basic given concerning who we
are as human beings. Practical reasoning can be employed, and with its aid, humans
can ultimately embody a “second” nature. Aristotle’s virtues are in fact independent
of mere nature and need to be developed as part of a second nature. (McDowell 1998)
Whether McDowell’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics is on point is beyond the
scope of the present study. McDowell’s distinction helps make apparent an important
difference in Nietzsche’s and Zhuang Zi’s therapeutic projects. First, Nietzsche would
find the distinction between mere and second nature helpful for articulating his view
of health. Nietzsche argues that there are certain natural facts about human beings that
should be taken into consideration in a normative account. But humans are also
unusual in the animal kingdom, as the “as yet undetermined animal.” (Nietzsche
2000a, 264) Brute nature by itself cannot tell individuals how to live; they must posit
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values in order to lead healthy lives. Like McDowell’s Aristotle, Nietzsche believes
that humans must posit values that are in some important sense continuous with
human nature—they are naturally made, not naturally given. While these values can
be established to some degree on the basis of the basic human desires mentioned
above, it seems that by themselves they are insufficient for creating values that
facilitate health. Even as will to power provides a constraint defining how humans
ought to live, it cannot offer on its own a comprehensive set of normative standards
that guide human life. Zhuang Zi’s notion of nature serves as an important point of
contrast; McDowell’s Aristotle would, of course, be incompatible with Zhuang Zi’s
version of health. In the context of normative ethics, Zhuang Zi believes that the
attainment of the normative Way requires that humans ground an experiential or
embodied knowledge, as opposed to a theoretical knowledge, of how to live squarely
in notions of what the world is like. In relying on an embodied knowledge of the way
things are, Zhuang Zi’s view requires only that aspect of human nature that is given,
what McDowell calls mere nature.
While there is a clear disagreement both in their respective views of nature—as
well as in their respective concepts of normative health that flow from these views of
nature—Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi differ from McDowell and Aristotle in highlighting
the importance of disabusing individuals of pernicious cultural influences, so as to
achieve health. There is, of course, no reason to think that McDowell’s
characterization of the good life has to conform to conventional morality. But that
McDowell locates ethical upbringing as the locus from which ethical life begins and
is cultivated might suggest its continuance in one form or another, rather than its
dissolution. Nietzsche and Zhuang Zi believe that it is possible to conceive of wholly
different ways of living, even if individuals cannot initially fully understand what
their respective visions entail. Individuals can only actualize these possibilities if they
question the very conventional thinking that underpins their moral upbringing.
Despite the fact that the details of Nietzsche’s and Zhuang Zi’s respective visions are
starkly different, we must not overlook the structural similarities that exist in
connection to their therapeutic visions. Both thinkers of this study, as part of a robust
notion of health, highlight the importance of living naturally and insist on disabusing
individuals of conventional ways of thinking, perceiving, and behaving, in order to
accomplish a state of health.
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